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In the human sciences, experimental research is used to establish causal relationships.
However, the extrapolation of these results to the target population can be problematic.
To facilitate extrapolation, we propose to use the statistical technique Latent Class Re-
gression Analysis in combination with the analogical reasoning theory for extrapolation.
This statistical technique can identify latent classes that differ in the effect of X on Y. In
order to extrapolate by means of analogical reasoning, one can characterize the latent
classes by a combination of features and then compare these features to features of the
target.Introduction. Experimental research is often regarded as the gold standard
in the human sciences (e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2010; for a review in med-
icine, see Bothwell et al. 2016). In this kind of research, randomization aims
to control for confounders by balancing the different conditions with respect
to all possible causal factors (for limitations, see, e.g., Deaton and Cartwright
2018). If randomization is successful, experimental research warrants causal
conclusions (e.g., Holland 1986). These conclusions are typically formulated
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All umiell 2009). However, what applies in aggregate is not necessarily informa-
tive about what is true for every individual in the sample population (for pa-
pers addressing this problem of group averages, see, e.g., Rothwell 1995;
Molenaar 2004; Navarro et al. 2006; Hamaker 2012; Speelman andMcGann
2013; Grice 2015; Rousselet, Pernet, andWilcox 2017). That is, if in an ideal
experiment X raises the probability of Y, the only thing one actually knows is
that X raises the probability of Y in some subgroup of the sample (Cartwright
2007).1 A subgroup is a maximally homogeneous group of individuals with a
ﬁxed arrangement of causal factors. Because within a subgroup, all causes of
Y other than X are ﬁxed at a certain level, the effect of X on Y is also ﬁxed.
The effect of X on Y in other subgroups may vary greatly, depending on the
type and degree of interaction between the other causal factors and X.
This limitation makes it difﬁcult to extrapolate an average experimental
outcome from the sample to the target population—the group of individuals
to which the outcome is to be generalized. If the sample and the target pop-
ulation were each homogeneous and identical with respect to the settings of
all other causal factors, the average result would represent the full sample,
and the result could be generalized to all individuals in the target (Steel
2008, 3). However, populations in the human sciences are heterogeneous,
which implies that it is not clear to which individuals in the target popula-
tion the effect can be extrapolated. This has been called the problem of ex-
trapolation (e.g., Steel 2008). According to Cartwright (2007), to justify the
claim that X causes Y in some members of the target population, one needs
to assume that at least one of the subgroups of the sample in which X causes
Y is identical in causal structure to a subgroup of the target population. For
this assumption to be met, one ﬁrst needs to determine what the target pop-
ulation is and then draw a large random sample. As a result, the distribution
of causal factors in the sample will be similar to the distribution of causal
factors in the target population, and the larger the sample, the more likely
that the distributions are indeed similar. The problem, though, is that in
practice it is complicated to deﬁne a target population and then draw a ran-
dom sample from this population (e.g., Sears 1986; for a proposal on how to
do this, see Simons, Shoda, and Lindsay 2017). Furthermore, because we
lack information about the target population and we do not know all other
causal factors, it is impossible to test whether the assumption has been met.
Suppose that the assumption is not satisﬁed: the subgroups in which X
causes Y, with their particular ﬁxed arrangements of other causal factors,1. While positive results in the ideal experiment demonstrate the existence of causation
in a subpopulation, neutral results do not demonstrate its absence. If there is no differ-
ence between the experimental (X) and the control (∼X) group concerning the probabil-
ity of Y it can still be true that X causes Y in a subgroup of the sample. This is the case
when there is another subgroup of the sample in which X has the opposite effect, and the
two mutually cancel out (Cartwright 2007).
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EXTRAPOLATION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 221do not share their causal structure with any subgroup of the target popula-
tion. Is it then still possible to extrapolate the result from the sample to the
target population? Furthermore, even if the assumption is met, the question
remains what the effect of X on Y is in the rest of the target population,
which is composed of other (unidentiﬁed) subgroups. The answers to these
questions depend on the distribution of the causal factors in the target and
on the degree and type of interaction between those factors and X. This is-
sue is an instance of what Steel (2008, 4) calls the extrapolator’s circle:
“The challenge . . . is to explain how the suitability of the model as a basis
for extrapolation can be established given only limited, partial information
about the target.” So, to substantiate the extrapolation of a causal relation
one needs to have detailed information about the target, but in that case ex-
trapolation would be unnecessary (4).
In sum, experimental studies are very useful to infer causal conclusions,
but extrapolation of the results to the target population can be problematic.
In what follows, two theories will be discussed that address the problem of
extrapolation: one by Steel (2008) and one by Guala (2003, 2005). Steel’s
method for extrapolation relies on mechanisms, but we will claim that this
method is not helpful when extrapolating from experimental systems in the
human sciences. We will then argue that the combination of Guala’s theory
and a certain statistical technique can facilitate the extrapolation of experi-
mental results in the human sciences.
Steel’s Theory of Comparative Process Tracing. Steel (2008) employs
causal mechanisms as a starting point for extrapolation. According to Steel,
a causal mechanism consists of “interacting components that generate a
causal regularity between some speciﬁed beginning and end points” (40).
In order to learn about these mechanisms, one uses a strategy called ‘pro-
cess tracing’. Starting from a beginning or an endpoint, one traces forward
or backward to reconstruct the paths connecting the variables that constitute
the mechanism. To then extrapolate knowledge of this mechanism from the
model to the target, one follows a procedure called ‘comparative process trac-
ing’ (89): comparing stages of the mechanism in the model with those in the
target in which the two are expected to differ. The greater the similarities
in the key stages of the mechanism, the more promising the extrapolation.
Process tracing is most appropriate in cases where the causal relationships
among components are more accessible than those among macrofeatures
of the system (175). In order to infer causal relations among a set of variables
that represent macrofeatures of a certain system, process tracing studies the
relations among the features of the component parts of the system (187).
Steel’s theory can be very useful if mechanistic knowledge is available.
However, Steel (2008) acknowledges that there are many cases in the hu-
man sciences where there is knowledge available about causal relations,This content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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All ubut not about the mechanisms underlying them. This is particularly true
in the case of experimental results, according to Steel, because mechanistic
knowledge is hard to obtain from experiments (163). There is just knowl-
edge of the probabilistic relation between cause and effect, but knowledge
of how the two are connected is often lacking. Moreover, in many cases
there are several plausible mechanisms (e.g., Gerring 2010). It is hard to
discover which ones are actually operating, under what conditions, and
how they interact. Furthermore, mechanisms themselves do not always be-
have in a regular manner (e.g., Howick, Glasziou, and Aronson 2013), and
the same mechanism can have opposite effects in different contexts (Elster
1998). In addition, variables in the human sciences are mostly latent. They
are not directly observed; there is no one-to-one relationship between a con-
struct and its operationalization. This makes the construction of a mecha-
nism even more difﬁcult, as we have knowledge of mechanisms mostly
at the level of operationalizations. Another problem of using Steel’s mech-
anistic approach is that it is most appropriate for extrapolating qualitative
causal claims (Steel 2008, 94). Many questions in the human sciences, how-
ever, are of a quantitative nature (Reiss 2008, 122). All in all, although the
mechanistic account can be very useful, it is not meant to solve the problem
of extrapolation from experimental systems in the human sciences.
Guala’s Theory of Analogical Reasoning. Guala’s (2003, 2005) theory is
based on a form of analogical reasoning: if one has (a) some controlled ini-
tial conditions in the laboratory and (b) some observed experimental result
on the one hand and given (c) some observed properties of the target system
and (d) some observational data on the other, then (by analogy) c stands in
the same (causal) relation to d as a stands to b (Guala 1998, 72). To extrap-
olate an experimental outcome, one has to ensure that the test system (i.e.,
the setting and the sample) and the target system (i.e., the setting and the
population) are as similar as possible; the two systems should match in all
respects that are relevant according to our current background knowledge
(Guala 2005, 2010). One should make sure that differences between the test
and the target system do not affect the relationship between X and Y. For ex-
ample, it is only possible to extrapolate from rats to humans if there is evi-
dence that the differences between the two species do not alter the causal
relation being extrapolated. Moreover, an experiment cannot demonstrate
much about a target system on its own, because different causal processes
may generate similar patterns of data (Guala 1998). One therefore needs to
rely on observational data. If the experimental and observational data are sim-
ilar, bymeans of analogical reasoning, the causal relationship in question can
be extrapolated to the target system.
To illustrate the analogical approach, Guala (2005, 2010) takes an exam-
ple from experimental economics. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) auctionsThis content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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EXTRAPOLATION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 223are common value auctions in which the auctioned good has the same value
for all participants without anyone knowing what the value is. These auc-
tions turned out to be systematically overpriced, possibly because of the
speciﬁc auction rules. To test this explanation, Kagel and Levin (1986) per-
formed an experimental study in which bidders did not know an item’s
value and were provided with a private or public information signal. Ac-
cording to the winner’s curse hypothesis, public information reduces the
uncertainty concerning the value of the item, thereby reducing overestima-
tion. Kagel and Levin observed that participants’ bids decreased when a
public information signal was provided (917), conﬁrming the winner’s curse
hypothesis. Now the question was whether the winner’s curse, observed un-
der experimental conditions, could explain the overpriced OCS auctions in
the target system. To answer this question, Kagel and Levin discussed an ob-
servational study byMead, Moseidjord, and Sorensen (1983) about the prof-
its from the leases of two different kinds of tracts: wildcat and drainage tracts.
More public information was available about the productivity of drainage
tracts. The winner’s curse hypothesis predicts that more public information
reduces uncertainty about the item’s value, thereby lowering bidders’ overes-
timation of the value and raising proﬁts (Kagel and Levin 1986, 915–16).
Mead and colleagues (1983) indeed found higher proﬁts from drainage leases
compared to wildcat leases, which again conﬁrmed the winner’s curse hy-
pothesis.
Guala illustrates the parallels between the experimental and real-world
processes in ﬁgure 1 (2010, 1077). The arrows represent causal relation-
ships, and the double lines represent analogical correspondences. The dashed
lines depict the conclusion following from the extrapolation. Guala writes:
“The analogy was backed up by looking for consequences or side-effects
of the (relevantly similar) mechanisms that supposedly govern the laboratory
and the target systems” (1077), and “by comparing analogous variations inFigure 1. Analogical reasoning in the Outer Continental Shelf example. Source:
Guala (2010, 1077).This content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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All uinformation and prices at a downstream stage of each mechanism, it is pos-
sible to extrapolate the winner’s curse result from the laboratory to the ﬁeld”
(1078). In sum, the experimental system was analogous to the target system,
and the observational data corresponded to the experimental results. As a re-
sult, the relationship between the amount and type of information and the bid-
ders’ proﬁts could be extrapolated by means of analogical inference from the
laboratory to the target system. Note, however, that it is always possible that
the similar outcomes observed in the laboratory and the target were still
caused by different factors, as inductive inferences like these are by nature
fallible.
Mechanistic Knowledge. The OCS case is one of the few examples Guala
gives to illustrate his theory. The extrapolation in this example is based on
just two analogies: the amount and type of information on the item’s value
and the bidders’ proﬁts. Moreover, the example is mechanistic in nature. In
the passage above, Guala invokes mechanistic knowledge, which he does in
other writings as well (e.g., Guala 2003). Now if mechanistic knowledge is
available, as in the OCS case, it might be used to extrapolate by means of
analogical reasoning. However, for many experimental results in the human
sciences, mechanistic knowledge is hard to obtain.
Although Guala (2010) stresses that the OCS example and the analogical
approach in general do not necessarily rely on mechanistic explanation, he
does not show how an extrapolation can be successful when not founded on
mechanistic knowledge. Is it possible to extrapolate through analogical rea-
soning when there is no mechanistic knowledge on hand? We will demon-
strate that it is. According to Guala, if there are sufﬁcient analogies between
the properties of the test system and the target system, and the experimental
data and the observational data have similar outcomes, then the relationship
at issue will presumably be valid in systems where the experimental condi-
tions do not hold. We argue that it is not necessary that these properties are
part of a mechanistic explanation. In what follows, a statistical technique
will be discussed that can accommodate extrapolation according to Guala’s
approach but without the help of mechanisms.
Latent Class Regression Analysis. As discussed in the introduction, in a
well-conducted experiment, if X raises the probability of Y, then X causes Y
in some subgroup of the test population. However, the effect of X on Y in
other subgroups can be very different. In this section, a statistical technique
is discussed that identiﬁes latent classes varying in the effect of X on Y,
which can be used to extrapolate by means of analogical reasoning.
Latent Class Regression Analysis (LCRA; Wedel and DeSarbo 1994;
Hagenaars and McCutcheon 2002; Magidson and Vermunt 2004) is a tech-
nique that can be used to predict the scores on a response variable (Y) fromThis content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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and LCRA is that in the latter, a categorical latent variable is postulated. A
latent variable is not directly measured but rather inferred from a set of ob-
served variables. This latent variable can divide the sample into possible la-
tent classes that differ with regard to the relationship between the predictor(s)
and the response variable. The underlying idea is that the population con-
sists of a number of subpopulations that differ with respect to the estimated
parameters of the statistical model of interest. Scores of participants belong-
ing to the same latent class are assumed to come from the same probability
distribution. A latent class consists of individuals for whom the predicted
effect of X on Y is similar but whose predicted effect is substantially differ-
ent from that of individuals from other latent classes, and a regression model
is estimated for each of the classes separately.2
Note that this approach differs from subgroup analysis (e.g., Szczech,
Berlin, and Feldman 1998; Kent et al. 2002) in the sense that one does not
need to know in advance what the subgroups are (for methodological prob-
lems of subgroup analysis, see Lanza and Rhoades 2013). Instead, the sub-
groups are empirically established using the data at hand. As an illustration
of the difference between LCRA and subgroup analysis, consider the follow-
ing study by Koppenol-Gonzalez, Bouwmeester, and Vermunt (2014). A
sample of 210 children age 5–12 years was presented with memory tasks de-
signed to differentiate between verbal and visual short-term memory (STM)
processes. The tasks were serial order reconstruction tasks requiring partici-
pants to place a set of presented pictures in their correct serial order. One se-
quence had visually similar pictures and represented words that were phono-
logically dissimilar, and the other sequence had visually dissimilar pictures
and represented words that were phonologically similar. Similarity was ma-
nipulated in order to distinguish between the use of verbal and visual STM
processes. That is, interference of phonological similarity implies the use of
verbal processes, whereas the interference of visual similarity implies the
use of visual processes. The dependent variable was a vector of correct/in-
correct responses of placing the pictures on the correct serial position. The
performance across the positions was expressed in a serial position curve,
which is the pattern of responses on each of the positions. The serial position
curve of the visually similar taskwas compared with the serial position curve
of the phonologically similar task. It was expected that when the serial po-
sition curve of the phonologically similar task showed signiﬁcantly worse
performance than that of the visually similar task, this indicated the use of
speciﬁc verbal processing. Conversely, when the serial position curve of2. Latent class analysis (LCA) does not require a regression model; there are other types
of LCA as well, like latent proﬁle analysis. For our purposes, the focus will be on
LCRA.
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All uthe visually similar task showed signiﬁcantly worse performance than that
of the phonologically similar task, this indicated the use of speciﬁc visual
processing.
The data were analyzed using two approaches; subgroup analysis as-
suming age is an appropriate grouping variable, and LCRA assuming a la-
tent grouping variable reﬂecting the use of verbal/visual STM processes
(Koppenol-Gonzalez et al. 2014). The results showed that the two approaches
led to different conclusions. Using age as a grouping variable, the children
did not seem to use a speciﬁc type of STM (see ﬁg. 2a) because the scores on
the visually similar pictures did not differ signiﬁcantly from the scores on the
phonologically similarpictures.However, usingLCRAﬁve latent classeswere
distinguished that did differ in the use of verbal/visual STM (see ﬁg. 2b).
Moreover, age did not play an important role in the formation of the latent
classes. Speciﬁcally, the age ranges of the ﬁve classes indicated that youngerFigure 2. Serial position curves with the probability of correct responses to phono-
logically and visually similar items for each age group (a) and serial position curves
for the latent classes (b). Source: Koppenol-Gonzalez et al. (2014).This content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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EXTRAPOLATION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 227and older children could be classiﬁed into any of the latent classes. Belowwe
will explain the different steps of LCRAon the basis of this study. The LCRA
starts by ﬁtting the model with one latent class and subsequently with an in-
creasing number of latent classes. The best balance between the ﬁt of the
model to the data and the parsimony of the model in terms of estimated pa-
rameters can be found using information criteria like the Bayesian informa-
tion criterion (BIC), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), or the likelihood
ratio chi-squared statistic (Magidson and Vermunt 2004). If the data are best
described by multiple latent classes, then parameter estimations will differ
across these classes. Participants’ class posterior membership probabilities
are estimated for each latent class. The class membership probabilities add
up to 1 for each participant, and participants are assigned to the class for which
their membership probability is the highest (Magidson and Vermunt 2004).
The degree to which the highest membership probability differs from 1 can
be regarded as classiﬁcation error. In the study from the example above, the
ﬁt statistics showed that according to the BIC the three-class model showed
the best balance between ﬁt and parsimony, but according to the AIC3 the
ﬁve-class model showed the best balance between ﬁt and parsimony. Two
classes were very similar in terms of interpretation in the three- and ﬁve-class
models. The three additional classes of the ﬁve-class model made a further
distinction in one of the classes of the three-classmodel. Using a combination
of these ﬁt statistics and substantive interpretation of the models, the model
with ﬁve latent classes was chosen for interpretation (Koppenol-Gonzalez
et al. 2014).
The next step is to identify the factors on the basis of which the latent
classes can be differentiated. In order to do so, one needs to have developed
hypotheses about potential factors on the basis of background knowledge.
These hypotheses can be tested in two different ways. The ﬁrst is to include
the suggested factors as covariates in the LCRA directly. In this way class
description is improved, as well as the classiﬁcation of new cases (Mag-
idson and Vermunt 2005). This procedure has several weaknesses, how-
ever; for example, it introduces new model-building problems and becomes
impractical with a large number of covariates (see Vermunt 2010, 451). The
alternative is to follow a three-step procedure. First, the latent class regres-
sion model is estimated. Second, cases are assigned to the class with the
highest class posterior membership probability (Magidson and Vermunt
2004). Finally, one tries to identify the factors predicting class membership
with the help of the appropriate statistical test. In the study of Koppenol-
Gonzalez and colleagues (2014), the latter approach was applied. Each
child was assigned to one of the ﬁve latent classes leading to a certain class
size, or put differently, an overall probability of belonging to each of the
latent classes. Each class was then characterized by a performance score.
This score, together with the indicators of the STM processes (i.e., similar-This content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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All uity and position of the pictures), enabled the researchers to interpret each of
the latent classes as follows: verbal STM with high performance (class 1),
verbal STM with low performance (class 2), visual STM with high perfor-
mance (class 3), visual STMwith low performance (class 4), and overall low
performance without a clear distinction between verbal and visual STM use
(class 5). Note, however, that this three-step procedure underestimates the as-
sociations between the factors and the latent classes as a result of the classi-
ﬁcation errors in the second step (Bolck, Croon, and Hagenaars 2004), and
therefore Vermunt (2010) has proposed two improved three-step procedures
(see also Bakk, Tekle, and Vermunt 2013).
We have now described the various features of latent classes regression
analysis. In the next section, we use class features to extrapolate causal con-
clusions following from an experiment.
Approaching the Problem of Extrapolation with Latent Classes. To ex-
trapolate experimental results by means of Guala’s analogical reasoning ap-
proach, LCRA can be of help. First, one examines whether there are latent
classes in the sample that differ with respect to the effect of the predictors on
the response variable. Note that this is possible without invoking strong the-
oretical assumptions about the latent variable(s), although in order to decide
on the number of latent classes, it is useful to have deﬁned hypotheses in this
regard. Second, one seeks to identify the factors responsible for partitioning
the sample into latent classes, which are then characterized by a combination
of features. Finally, in order to extrapolate an effect, features of the classes are
described as detailed as possible and then compared with features of the tar-
get population.
For example, the acute respiratory distress syndrome is deﬁned by the
clinical criteria of pulmonary opacities on a chest radiograph, arterial hyp-
oxemia, and exclusion of cardiac failure as a primary cause (Calfee et al.
2014). Calfee and colleagues (2014) used LCA to explore whether multiple
classes of the syndrome could be identiﬁed, using both baseline clinical data
and biomarker levels. In two separate samples (n 5 473 and n 5 549), LCA
showed that a two-class model provided the best ﬁt to the data. These two
classes of patients differed in plasma levels of inﬂammatory biomarkers,
heart rate and total minute ventilation, serum bicarbonate, vasopressor use,
prevalence of certain risk factors (i.e., sepsis and trauma), and ventilator-free
and organ-failure-free days. Furthermore, one of the two samples came from
a randomized controlled trial in which the treatment of mechanical ventila-
tion with higher versus lower positive-end expiratory pressure (PEEP) was
investigated. It turned out that within class 1, the mortality rate was higher
after high PEEP (24%) than after low PEEP (16%), while in class 2, the mor-
tality rate was higher after low PEEP (51%) than after high PEEP (42%).
Also, this interaction effect between PEEP strategy and latent class was evenThis content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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days.
Now in order to extrapolate these results according to the method devel-
oped here, latent class features are compared to features of the target pop-
ulation. The claims to be extrapolated are conditional sentences. For instance,
if an individual in the target has high plasma levels of inﬂammatory biomark-
ers, frequent vasopressor use, low serum bicarbonate, a high prevalence of
sepsis, high heart rate and high total minute ventilation, and relatively few
ventilator-free and organ-failure-free days, it is likely that the individual be-
longs to class 2, and high PEEP is recommended. By contrast, if these base-
line measures and biomarker levels indicate that the individual belongs to
class 1, low PEEP is the best option. In sum, the higher the similarities between
the predicates in the antecedent and the features of the target, the stronger the
basis for extrapolation.
As another example of LCRA, Magidson and Vermunt (2005) discuss a
case study in which 400 persons were asked to indicate their ‘purchase in-
tent’ regarding eight products (such as shoes) that differed in the following
attributes: fashion (traditional vs. modern), quality (low vs. high), and price
(lower vs. higher). The variables sex and age were included as covariates in
the LCRA. One- to four-class models were estimated with and without co-
variates, and the three-class model with the covariates ﬁtted the data best.
People in the ﬁrst latent class had a preference for modern, lower-price
products. The attribute quality was not relevant in this class. The second la-
tent class favored modern, lower-price, high-quality products. The third la-
tent class was inclined to buy lower-price, high-quality products and was
not inﬂuenced by the attribute fashion. Furthermore, the ﬁrst class included
a higher proportion of females than the other two latent classes; in the sec-
ond class males were overrepresented. The ﬁrst class also had a higher pro-
portion of young people than the other two classes, and older people more
often belonged to the third class than to the other two classes. Now if an
individual in the target is a young female, then chances are high that she
is inclined to buy cheap, modern products, without considering their qual-
ity. If an individual in the target is an older person, he or she will probably
have a preference for cheap but high-quality products, regardless of their
trendiness.
Note, however, that latent classes are not always as easy to interpret as in
the example above (for another example, see Liew, Howe, and Little 2016).
If this were the case, then LCRAwould not even be necessary because the
variables sex and age could just as well be included as predictors in a stan-
dard regression analysis (see Rothwell 2005). To illustrate the additional ad-
vantages of LCRA, consider the following study by Bouwmeester and
Verkoeijen (2011). They investigated the testing effect: the phenomenon
that taking a test of previously studied material improves retrieval moreThis content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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All uthan restudying. In a within-subjects design with the factor study method
(restudy vs. test), 131 children studied 12 lists of semantically related words
either through restudying of through taking a test. Each list had a strong back-
ward association with one semantically related word (“lure”) that was not in
the list. One week later they took a ﬁnal recognition test consisting of pre-
viously studied words, unrelated ‘distractors’, and the semantically related
words. The false recognition of semantically related words was used as an
indication of gist trace processing: the ability to form a gist memory of the
elements that the words had in common. An LCRA found three latent
classes within the sample. In the ﬁrst class a large testing effect emerged:
tested words were recognized much more often than restudied words. In
the second class a small testing effect was observed, and in the third class
no testing effect occurred. Furthermore, the latent classes differed in gist
trace processing. In the second class, the false recognition of lures in the
testing condition was lower than in classes 1 and 3. By contrast, the third
latent class showed stronger gist trace processing in the restudy condition
than the other two classes. This example demonstrates the additional advan-
tages of LCRA as compared to the predeﬁned groups in a standard regres-
sion analysis: the classes are interpreted on the basis of speciﬁc experimen-
tal tasks, and they are then externally validated by a new set of scores (i.e.,
the lures).
In order to extrapolate these results (Bouwmeester and Verkoeijen 2011)
according to the method expounded in this article, one compares features of
the latent classes to features of the target population. For children in the tar-
get who draw on gist trace processing when restudying, restudy might be at
least as effective as testing. For children in the target who do rely on gist
trace processing when they are tested but not when they restudy, in contrast,
testing will probably be more effective than restudying. This approach to
extrapolation is in line with Guala’s theory. His theory states that we need
to rely on the correspondence between observed features of the target and
observed features of the experimental system (Guala 2003). In the present
proposal, the observed features of the experimental system are the features
of the latent classes. The more analogies between them and the features of
the individuals in the target population and the more the experimental re-
sults correspond to observational data (Guala 2003, 2005), the more reliable
the extrapolation of the causal relationship at issue.
According to this approach, it is not necessary to reveal the mechanism
connecting cause and effect. In the purchase intent example above, gender
and age are not part of a causal mechanism, but they do form the relevant
features by which the latent classes are described. It is possible, but not nec-
essary, that these features come out as components of a mechanism connect-
ing X and Y. For example, gist trace processing can be part of a mechanism
explaining the effect of testing on retrieval. The factors determining classThis content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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X on Y, which LCRAmay help to uncover. However, it is not necessary that
the features of the classes are part of a causal mechanism in order to extrap-
olate the results from latent classes to subpopulations.
Causally Relevant Differences. As discussed in the introduction, a sub-
group as deﬁned by Cartwright (2007) has a ﬁxed arrangement of causal
factors other than the experimental treatment X. It is a maximally homoge-
neous group of individuals, in which all causes of Y other than X are held
ﬁxed at a certain level. This entails that within a subgroup, the effect of X
on Y is also ﬁxed. A latent class, however, is not maximally homogeneous.
That is, a latent class consists of individuals who are similar but not equal
with respect to the effect of X on Y. To some extent a latent class is homo-
geneous, but it does allow for some variation in the effect and X on Y and,
accordingly, in the arrangements of other causal factors. This implies that,
because not all other causes of Y are necessarily held ﬁxed within a class, a
latent class may consist of several subgroups.
Now if an experimental study yields a positive effect, this means that X
causes Y in some subgroup of the sample. The effects of X in other sub-
groups may be very different. According to Cartwright (2007), to extrapo-
late the conclusion that X causes Y in some members of the target popula-
tion, one needs to assume that at least one of the subgroups of the sample
in which X causes Y is causally identical to a subgroup of the target. How-
ever, since we lack information about the target population, we cannot ﬁnd
out whether the assumption has been met or what the effect is of X on Y in
other subgroups of the target.
LCRA is able to discover latent classes for which the predicted effect
of X on Y differs in the sample. We describe the classes on the basis of
some features and extrapolate the class-speciﬁc effects to individuals in the
target population who meet the description of one of the classes. Since not
all causal factors are identiﬁed and classes cannot be described exhaus-
tively, it is possible that by applying this method, an effect is extrapolated
to a person in the target whose subgroup was not represented in the sample.
To take the purchase intent example, the ﬁrst class had a preference for
modern, lower-price products, regardless of quality. In this class, young fe-
males were overrepresented. On the basis of these ﬁndings, a young female
in the target is predicted to buy modern, lower-price products. However, it
is possible that the young female in the target has a high socioeconomic sta-
tus (SES), while the young females in the ﬁrst class of the sample had low/
average SES. If SES is a relevant causal factor for shoe purchase intent,
then the subgroup in the target to which the young female with high SES
belongs is not represented in the sample, and the extrapolation may not
be justiﬁed.This content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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female in the target, a causal relation is inferred to be present in a member of
a subgroup that was not part of the sample. However, because many causal
factors have not been identiﬁed as such (like SES in the example), this ex-
trapolation is acceptable according to the present proposal. That is, a sub-
group has a ﬁxed arrangement of other causal factors, of which some are un-
known to us. We are therefore unable to identify all subgroups in the sample,
and we do not knowwhether all subgroups in the target are represented in the
sample. As a result, it might happen that a relation is extrapolated to an indi-
vidual whose subgroup was not causally identical to that of the sample, but
we are unable to check whether this is the case.
The only necessary condition for extrapolation according to this proposal
is that the individuals in the target meet the description of the appropriate
class. This implies that inferences from one population to another are al-
lowed. As with any inductive method, these inferences are uncertain; the pur-
chase intent of the young female with high SES in the target might be differ-
ent from the purchase intent found in the ﬁrst class. It is therefore essential to
characterize the classes as accurately as possible and to try to check whether
the known differences between the sample and the target can confound the
extrapolation.
Whether extrapolation is a sensible option depends on the nature of the
explanatory variable, the number of replications of the study, the differences
between the effect sizes in the samples, and the degree to which the classes
are deﬁned. Moreover, an important concern is whether the classiﬁcation
that emerges from an LCRA is stable. It is possible that the number of classes
varies between studies, and in that sense LCRA suffers from the same short-
comings as standard regression analysis. In order to determine whether the
number and the speciﬁcation of the classes are robust, one therefore needs
to perform replication studies (Ioannidis 2005; Schmidt 2009; Cumming
2012; Open Science Collaboration 2012; Pashler and Wagenmakers 2012;
Klein et al. 2014).
Conclusion. According toGuala, themore an experiment resembles the nat-
ural situation, themore likely is it that the extrapolation in question is reliable.
If there are sufﬁcient parallels between the properties of the test system and
the target system, and the experimental data and the observational data are
similar, then the causal relationship under study will probably obtain in the
target system. It is not required that these properties are part of a causal mech-
anism. If a mechanism is identiﬁed, it can be valuable for extrapolation pur-
poses. However, for many phenomena in the human sciences, there is no
mechanistic explanation available.
The method developed here is a reﬁnement of Guala’s theory. LCRA is
able to discover classes in the sample for which the effect of the explanatoryThis content downloaded from 031.151.117.231 on March 31, 2019 21:12:10 PM
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EXTRAPOLATION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 233variable varies. In order to extrapolate by means of analogy but without re-
lying on mechanistic knowledge, the existence of latent classes should be
checked and interpreted with the help of background knowledge. The latent
classes are then described by a combination of features. The causal relations
being extrapolated are formulated as a set of conditional sentences in which
features of the classes are in the antecedent, and the direction and size of the
effect are in the consequent. The more analogies between the features of the
classes and features of individuals in the target, the stronger the case for ex-
trapolation.
The only requirement for extrapolation according to this proposal is that
individuals in the target meet the description of the appropriate class. Be-
cause we do not know all other causal factors and we cannot describe the
classes exhaustively, it is possible that these individuals differ from the tested
individuals in causally relevant ways. This means that, just like Steel’s pro-
posal (Howick et al. 2013), we cannot fully avoid the extrapolator’s circle.
Therefore, we should deﬁne the classes carefully and try to discover whether
differences between the test and the target can confound the inference. Given
the inductive framework, this is all that we are capable of doing.3REFERENCES
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